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i 
Hegel's Phenomenology, now turning 200, has ceased to be an odd stum­
bling block in the historical memory of present­day philosophy. In recent 
years, significant work has contributed to the exploration and appropria­
tion of Hegel's text. Someone who started studying this work more than 
half a century ago, as I did, can only envy those approaching the text today. 
Thanks to a discussion among experts that has increased in intensity and 
international scope over the past thirty­five years, belginners can now turn 
to excellent collections of essays.1 Sustained unitary interpretations2 have 
illuminated the whole extent of the enterprise. An encompassing and 
erudite essay3 has clarified the full complexity of its underlying idea. 
Invigoratingly controversial and easily accessible studies have illuminated 
various parts of the work in more detail, and the context of these individual 
topics within the Hegelian oeuvre, life, and influence has been revealed in 
comprehensive accounts that in many respects mutually complement and 
correct each other.4 
The tendency towards crudely one­sided interpretations, such as those 
that dominated the scene in the middle of the twentieth century, is hardly 
visible today. Someone who sets out now to discover a substantial truth 
or to find himself in the Phenomenology does not run the risk of falling 
prey to the misinterpretations that were at one time very pervasive. Well 
informed as we are about the prehistory that the Phenomenology had in 
Hegel's thought, and familiar as we are with the contractual conditions 
under which the work had to be completed, we are even less prone to 
Translated by David P. Schweikard. 
1 E.g. Poggeler and Kohler (1998); Stewart (1998). 
2 Scheier (1986); Pinkard (1994); Siep (2000). 3 Forster (1998). 
4 For instance, Pippin (1989,1997); Pinkard (2000); Fulda (2003); Jaeschke (2003); Hoffmann (2004). 
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believe in the tale that Theodor Haering invented about its genesis.5 Even if 
one admits that there is evidence that the Phenomenology as it was published 
still carries traits of radical changes in its composition, no one who reads it 
alongside more recent secondary literature will find plausible that it is 
nothing but a congenial product of distress that fundamentally lacks 
coherence. The declared program and the idea of this magnum opus, the 
starting point and aim, method and makeup, train of thought, inner 
structure, and process of presentation, are too subtly interweaved to infer 
the inconsistency of the whole simply by applying a few external criteria.6 
Those who take Hegel seriously as a thinker and want to interpret his 
Phenomenology as a systematic work are no longer completely isolated.7 
The first imperative for further interpretation is to pay close attention to 
the text, for only then does thinking about the Phenomenology become 
productive. 
The way in which Hegel has assimilated the basic concepts of the 
Phenomenology into his Encyclopedia doctrine of Subjective Spirit has by 
now been studied in detail. Even the possibility of connecting the later 
more complex content of the Phenomenology with the systematic philoso­
phy of Objective and Absolute Spirit now appears much more plausible. 
Contemporary interest is not limited to the first four chapters, but also 
extends to the latter four of the eight chapters numbered in Roman 
numerals. There is now interest in the topics dealt with in those chapters: 
"The actualization of reason", "The ethical order," and "Religion," includ­
ing their interconnections and the partial identity of religious representing 
and absolute knowing. There is even interest in studying the implications 
of the fact that the epistemological questions involved in these topics 
become more and more concrete from chapter to chapter. 
The different dimensions advanced by distinct national cultures of 
reception in recent decades have also enriched the appropriation and 
study of the Phenomenology. In Germany, the interpretation that reduced 
the work to anthropological aspects has been left behind and the genesis of 
the Phenomenology reconstructed. Colleagues in France have integrated the 
important motifs of reduction into a careful exegesis of the entire work and 
5 See Haering (1934). 
6 In a letter to Schelling (of May 1,1807), to which especially those refer who doubt the homogeneity of 
the Phenomenology, Hegel mentions the "wretched confusion" which ­ along with the "process of 
publishing and printing" ­ "partly dominates even the composition itself." That does not exclude a 
coherent and internally consistent result- in spite of the admitted­"shapelessness of the final parts," 
the editing of which was, according to this testimony, finished "at midnight before the battle of Jena" 
{Briefe, vol. 1), 16. Letters, 79­80. 
7 But see Henrich (1971), 7. 
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(thanks to a new translation)8 have developed a sensitive understanding of the 
literary qualities of the philosophical idiom that Hegel invented with the 
Phenomenology. From English-speaking countries there have been not only 
perspicacious analyses of the argumentative potential contained in Hegel's 
work, but also new directions of research that have grown out of the 
similarities between Hegel and specific priorities of Anglo-American philos­
ophy, such as pragmatism, the critique of the myth of the given, contextualist 
epistemology, and the inferential semantics of making explicit. Above all, this 
climate of reception has opened the debate on the reassessment of Hegel's 
entire philosophy and sharpened the debate with respect to the crucial 
questions: Is Hegel's place one before the threshold to modern society and 
the modern intellectual world?9 Or does he, after early modern philosophy 
and seventeenth­ and eighteenth­century Enlightenment, and by bringing 
Kant's revolution of metaphysics to an end, take the last step towards a self­
knowledge in which modernity can enlighten itself about its own presuppo­
sitions? If the latter, can he accomplish this task without forfeiting its deepest 
conceptual content, including its effectiveness for irrational "life" (with the 
self­destructive consequences, originating from Germany, that this has had 
for Europe)? In order to be able to take a stand on these questions, one has to 
give precise formulations of the program of the Phenomenology and its 
implementation. Such an interpretation should also be epistemological in 
nature. Great progress has been made in this field in recent decades. What can 
be said about my topic in a short chapter must, under these conditions, take 
only the shape of a corrective. 
2 
To what kind of epistemological question did Hegel dedicate his introduc­
tory Phenomenology? It seems to me that a good answer to this question, one 
that clarifies the program of the work, requires a more complex approach 
than those that have been pursued so far. It is clear that a more adequate 
approach cannot be focused on the most universal alternatives of "episte­
mology," such as, for instance, the alternative between epistemological 
idealism and epistemological realism, though Hegel does also contribute 
to this.10 Furthermore, it is clear that in the Hegelian Phenomenology 
Trans . Jean­Pierre Lefebvre, publ ished in the Bibl io theque phi losophique, Paris (1991—92). 
9 Cf. Taylor (1975, 1979). IO See Westpha l (1989); Fulda (2004). 
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epistemic problems of the specific sciences can be treated only 
through the specific shapes of "observed" consciousness and not in 
terms of the justification of claims to knowledge made by the philos­
ophizing phenomenologist. It should also be uncontroversial that the 
epistemic horizon of this phenomenologist includes not only those 
alleged or actual insights of specific sciences or of prescientific com­
mon sense (or the critique of common sense), and not only theoretical 
insights. This horizon equally includes the practical and such insights 
(alleged or actual) as those found in religious or normative—aesthetical 
knowledge, insights that cannot be subsumed under the theoretical or 
the practical, though they contain both kinds of knowledge. Likewise, 
the cognition and knowledge claimed by the phenomenologist should 
not be understood in the sense of the old textbook definition, i.e. as a 
pure taking­to­be­true that is true and justified by reasons which are 
sufficient although they are abstracted from all social and temporal 
context of appearance. Finally, the subject of such knowledge should 
not be seen throughout as an entirely indeterminate, isolated "taker" 
of such taking­to­be­true, but must be seen both in connection with increas­
ingly concrete capacities, attitudes, and activities, and in increasingly complex 
interconnection with other subjects and with institutions or other collective, 
cultural forms. In short, in connection with a "Spirit" whose content is 
increasingly determinate. 
More important in this regard (since it has not received as much 
attention) is to guard against presupposing that the cognition sought by 
the philosophizing phenomenologist must be theoretical. It should not be 
presupposed that this cognition has to ground theories about (and be 
verified in view of) objects and facts which are the case independent of 
the existence or non­existence of a theory about them. In contrast to this 
widespread assumption, which places the Phenomenology in a tradition in 
which epistemology is limited to philosophical cognizing, it could indeed 
turn out for the phenomenologist that the assumptions of this reduction 
must be abandoned. The same holds for the view that philosophical 
cognition refers to an "object" which is entirely independent of this 
thought and according to which thought must be adjusted and (if neces­
sary) corrected. The corrective could instead be the most inner reality of 
thought itself. 
Closely connected with the abandonment of these dogmatic pre­
suppositions, there are three more considerations and corresponding 
Hegelian expressions that belong to the basic elements of the program of 
the Phenomenology: 
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1. Not only can that which is to be cognized be something other than a 
theoretical object, it need not even be an "object" in the sense of some­
thing finitely real or something possible in the world, and indeed it need 
not even be the world itself. Rather, the cognizing can be about some­
thing that is both real in the broadest sense and yet distinguishable from 
the world and its objects. This is why Hegel, right at the beginning of the 
"Introduction," writes only in a very indefinite way about an "actual 
cognition of what truly is" (53, ^73). There could be something that 
belongs to all that truly is, that is effective in the one who cognizes, that 
is not external to him though it is distinguished from him, but that is 
nevertheless neither in the world nor the world itself. 
2. If this is the case, what "truly is" need not be nature or belong to 
nature, even as natura naturans. It could be the content of a metaphysical 
insight, perhaps even one of world­transcendent and "supernatural" 
objects. It might also, though, turn out that such objects do not belong 
to that which truly is, or that the content of the knowledge developed in 
a phenomenology of spirit cannot be the content of metaphysics. 
Likewise, it is for the moment completely open whether metaphysics 
can be a philosophical discipline that provides knowledge, and whether, 
if metaphysics is possible, it need be (for example) a metaphysics of 
cognition­independent objects. Above all, it is open whether the objects 
of a possible metaphysics subdivide (as in Kant), into (a) the (appearing 
or supernatural) world, (b) the final subjects of knowledge acquired in 
the world but not locatable in the world, and (c) a world­transcendent 
God (or more than one) or an immanent cause of the world. 
The most urgent task of the enterprise of a phenomenology of spirit is 
to understand how an epistemology of philosophical cognition gradually 
develops. The reconstruction of this insight is crucial to the understanding 
of Hegel's philosophy as a whole and of the role played in it by an 
introductory doctrine of appearing spirit. For only through the phenom­
enological self­cognition of spirit, only through realizing that the sociality 
and historicity of reason is constitutive of such a science, can the funda­
mental alternatives for the overall assessment of Hegel's philosophy be 
decided. (1) Does this self­cognition work towards a metaphysics of Spirit? 
Or does it reject all metaphysics of objective entities, even if they are 
conceived as the Nature, the Spirit or the One Absolute? (2) Does affirma­
tion of the latter part of the alternative entail rejecting all metaphysics? Or 
does this rather make room for a new metaphysics that is not conceived as 
onto­theological? (3) Does the Phenomenology of 1807 successfully lead to 
this sort of metaphysics, namely to the Science of Logic as the only "actual" 
26 H A N S - F R I E D R I C H F U L D A 
metaphysics? Or does Hegel's work of 1807 in fact fail to satisfy these 
demands? (4) Does the absolute knowing that the Phenomenology is 
supposed to produce and justify discharge the representational finitude 
of religious knowing? Or does knowledge, without losing the content of 
true religious knowledge, acquire in absolute knowing a specific fin­
itude that belongs to speculative cognition and that it lacks as pure 
religious knowledge? I want to plead emphatically for interpreting 
Hegel as affirming the latter parts of these alternatives. 
For the moment, precisely this interpretation has to be postponed. It 
should not be anticipated by the usual reference to passages of the Preface 
to the Phenomenology. For this was actually a preface to the planned 
"system of science" in which the Phenomenology would be the first, 
introductory part. As a preliminary explanation of the system, the 
Preface had to mention and anticipate topics in a way that could not 
actually be part of a scientific introduction to such a system, and espe­
cially not part of an initial exposition of the program of this introduction. 
Such an introduction could take place only in the implementation of the 
introductory program itself. This means that the project of an introduc­
tion itself only becomes fully clear in the process of the implementation of 
the Phenomenology. This fact often remains unnoticed by interpreters of 
the Phenomenology, so it shall have my full attention in what follows. 
3. The phenomenological procedure of initially bracketing metaphysical 
assumptions, followed by a critical examination of the partial validity of 
these assumptions or by their conclusive dismissal, makes it seem 
especially natural that prior to all true cognition of that which truly is, 
one has to come to an understanding "about cognition" (53, ^[73). It 
seems that with regard to potential metaphysical claims of knowledge 
one has to pursue a "prolegomenon" to a future systematic redemption 
of such claims like the one Kant offered in his first Critique. The 
connection to Kant's "Revolution der Denkungsarf that Hegel draws 
in his Logic11 and the later characterization of this Logic as "metaphysics 
proper"12 suggests that the Phenomenology should not only be taken in 
analogy to the Critique of Pure Reason as a vestibule to this metaphysics, 
but also as a "treatise of the method" of metaphysics. O n closer inspec­
tion this interpretation proves to be mistaken, for a work written on this 
basis does not contain anything decisive to set it apart from its dia­
metrical opposite (which is to dart headfirst into the cognition of 
absolute truth), apart from some prejudices that decrease rather than 
11 Cf. Wissenschaft der Logik {WL). Niirnberg 1812. Preface, first sentence. 12 WL, 7th para. 
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increase the chances of cognition. In any case, in such a work there are 
presuppositions that must first be examined (54, \ j \ f f ) . Thus, both 
beginnings of systematic philosophy are to be rejected for easily appre­
ciated epistemological reasons. One can avoid having to choose 
between them only by undertaking the task of "expounding" (55, 
^[71) knowledge as it appears in the broadest possible way. This 
means not only to judge it as true or false, insight or error, but to 
"comprehend" what in it has "substance and solid worth" (11, ^3), even 
if this turns out to be very little. 
Note how sparingly Hegel expresses the program of a phenomenology of 
spirit, even in comparison with the modest linguistic effort that is needed 
to justify it! The formula "exposition of how knowledge makes its appear­
ance" (55, %y6) does not even distinguish between the appearing philo­
sophical knowledge aimed at systematic science and other appearing 
knowledge, although this distinction already belongs to the context of 
justification and although the Phenomenology aims to be an account of 
both kinds of appearing knowledge. The programmatic formula remains 
even more sparse with regard to the relationship between its concepts and 
the heavy metaphysical concepts in the Preface, such as the concept of 
truth conceived not only as substance, but at the same time as subject 
(18, ^fi8). By conceptualizing its program through an "Introduction" to the 
Phenomenology, Hegel does not, in contrast to Kant, want to "design" the 
"Idea" and with it the whole contour or plan of a metaphysical discipline 
that follows the prolegomenon "architectonically, i.e. from principles."13 
He does not even outline a full idea of the philosophical science that the 
Phenomenology is supposed to become, nor a concept of its relationship to 
philosophy similar to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Could it really be that 
this simply represents the crudity of Hegel's plan for the work, or is it not a 
rather precise concept of the task of an introduction to the program of an 
exposition of appearing knowledge? The plausibility of both the program 
and its composition would only be corrupted if conceptual presuppositions 
were invoked at the outset, for these would require a further vestibule or 
create the suspicion that the projected enterprise is persuasive only together 
with dogmatic presuppositions. It is completely appropriate for Hegel to 
formulate the program of his Phenomenology on the minimal basis of the 
"exposition of appearing knowledge" (18, ^fi8) and to develop the program 
through a number of steps to that of a "Science of the Experience of 
Consciousness" (61, ^[88), and then further down a much longer path, 
Kant (CPR), B XXII, B 27. 
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that comprises the whole Phenomenology, to the "science of appearing knowl­
edge" (434, ^[808), and ultimately to a "Science of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit."14 The program of this work and its implementation thus seem to be 
deeply intertwined. For the sake of its explication even the program itself 
needs an implementation in the course of its introduction. But its actual 
implementation, for which it is the program, also further develops the 
concept of the program. Only viewed from its end is the title of the work 
fully comprehensible. 
3 
Much more could be said about this than space here will allow. But we are 
concerned with the introductory explication of the program, which is not 
intended to give the idea of the whole of a Phenomenology that opens the 
philosophical "system of science." It suffices to sketch the succession and 
the interconnection of its steps. Even when looked at cursorily, these steps 
confirm the proposed work­in­progress strategy in three respects. 
First, the cognitive horizon of the exposition of appearing knowledge 
encompasses the whole range of consciousness, and "completeness of the 
forms of the unreal consciousness" of the truth will result only from a 
cognitive process, "through the necessity of the progression," from partic­
ular forms to other forms (56, ^79). The goal set for this progression can be 
stated only very formally because the procedure itself needs to be defined. 
From the perspective of the self­conception of the "natural" consciousness 
that is to be examined, the goal will lie at a stage where this consciousness 
does not have to "go beyond itself anymore, and where "Concept corre­
sponds to object and object to concept." For it is "for itself the Concept of 
itself and therefore it is immediately "something that goes beyond limits" 
(57, ^[80). Anyone can make this evident to himself with respect to his 
moral consciousness and its incessant unease under a self­conception that is 
higher than, but intrinsic to, himself. Only from a discussion of the 
procedure of the exposition 0/appearing knowledge can one expect to learn 
more about the forms of unreal consciousness, their completeness, their 
succession from one to another, and about the goal to which the succession 
is directed. 
Second, we should be led by the "method of carrying out the inquiry" 
(58, ^[81). This characterizes, within the horizon of appearing knowledge, 
14 This heading on the subsequently inserted title page of the Phenomenology is not rendered in the 
English edition. 
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not the "idea of the whole" but the way to this idea. It is the way through 
which the natural consciousness has to pass to true knowledge, not on its 
own, but together with philosophizing knowledge. The basic epistemolog-
ically relevant characteristics of this path can be delineated in five 
moments: 
1. In the justification of claims to knowledge and in the examination of 
whether the concept corresponds to the object and vice versa, the 
presentation can be successful only if the appearing philosophical cog­
nition, the "we" perspective, restrains itself in its observation of the 
natural consciousness and its claims to knowledge. The natural con­
sciousness can and must give itself its own standard for the examination, 
for it is "for itself the Concept of itself (57, ^80), and it must examine 
itself according to this standard. As one can make plausible to oneself 
with the case of moral knowledge, the natural consciousness can achieve 
this if it is not deluded from the outside or distracted from its path by 
sophistications. This is why ­ at least initially ­ the accompanying 
philosophical knowledge should observe carefully how, on the assump­
tion of its particular standard, consciousness searches skeptically for the 
truth in its (at least alleged) knowledge and how it gains experience 
through the examination of specific claims to knowledge. This can 
happen in that the readers of the presentation concentrate on the role 
which the natural consciousness plays and as they practice skepticism 
regarding its object and its alleged knowledge, while those same readers, 
in the role of incipient scientific—philosophical cognition and knowl­
edge, restrict themselves to "looking on" (59, ^[84) or calling the natural 
consciousness's attention to the obvious. 
2. On the part of the philosophical knowledge that initially only looks on, 
there may be a strong suspicion, stemming from moral knowledge and 
conscience, that the observed consciousness will undergo a negative 
experience at every single stage of its examination. But this suspicion 
should not serve as an anticipation of the result of the examination. 
Even if the experience of the examination is necessarily negative, the 
natural consciousness must still discover for itself that this is so. Though 
distinct from it, the accompanying philosophical knowledge is itself 
only an appearing knowledge. 
3. The more continuous the progress of natural consciousness is along its 
path, the more convincing will the account of appearing knowledge 
be. This account will be most convincing as a "detailed history of the 
education of consciousness itself — namely, if all goes well — "to the 
standpoint of Science" (56, ^[78). If the philosophical knowledge (as 
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accompanying the natural consciousness and, if necessary, correcting 
itself through its own skepticism) is also included in this continuous 
progress, then it will be a kind of skepticism that is directed at the entire 
range of the knowledge appearing in consciousness and that will "render 
the Spirit for the first time competent to examine what truth is" (56, ^[78). 
This by no means results in a merely narrative history, but "brings about a 
state of despair about all the so-called natural ideas, thoughts, and 
opinions" (56, %yS). If, in addition, all non-philosophical kinds of 
appearing knowledge (and even the non-scientific philosophical kinds 
of appearing knowledge) do not ultimately stand up to the examination, 
but the philosophical knowledge stands up to its self-examination in one 
of its guises, then the goal is attained at least for one part of the 
presentation, namely that of philosophical knowledge. But the goal has 
been fully attained, and the presentation of appearing knowledge has 
become a "self-completing skepticism," only when the natural conscious­
ness itself has been brought to a decisive insight. It must realize that it 
cannot end in skeptical knowledge of its ignorance, but that there is at 
least one point in its appearing knowledge through which it can pass over 
without alternative to that philosophical knowledge (to knowledge that is 
no longer merely appearing, but rather actual knowledge). Whether the 
implementation of this program will get to that point admittedly remains 
unstated right to the end. But in any case, the program is aimed at the 
possibility of such an ending. Two further moments that are closely 
connected with this must not be left open, but must be integrated into 
the procedure right from the beginning. 
4. The skepticism of the procedure of examination cannot be the ancient one 
that was directed exclusively at objects that putatively exist. It must rather 
integrate into the procedure specific ways of knowing and standpoints of 
consciousness from which something can count as the true that corre­
sponds to the standard. That means not only examining its object, but 
examining just as thoroughly its specific (putative or actual) knowledge, so 
that it will have to give up its standard and itself. Skepticism is specifically 
modern if it is also directed at consciousness's capacity for truth and 
knowledge and not exclusively at objects of putative knowledge. The 
experience that leads to examination is an experience of consciousness. If 
its exposition were to obtain a scientific character through the procedure, 
and if a systematicity of experience were established thereby, then it would 
be the science of the experience of consciousness. 
5. But such systematicity could not arise solely from the natural conscious­
ness, which works on its self­examination and is observed only in this 
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regard. Insofar as systematicity is constitutive of the scientific character of 
philosophy (as Kant had believed), philosophical knowledge and its 
presentation (i.e. the presentation of non-philosophical knowledge and 
of itself as appearing knowledge) would not take on a scientific character 
on the basis of merely observing non-philosophical knowledge. It would 
not even achieve the character of an incipient science (one that would still 
stand in need of improvement in many respects). But the profile of the 
procedure that is taking shape up to this point contains a further element 
to which we now must attend. Regarding this element, one could even 
refer to the conception of an exposition [Darstellung], provided that 
"exposition" stands not only for the claim to judge (and to be judged), 
but at the same time for the claim that what has "substance and solid 
worth" is "grasped" in what is judged, and therefore at least approximately 
included in the scientific "Concept." Therefore one must reflect on what 
this means for the (up until now) silent interplay of the observed, self-
examining natural consciousness with the philosophical knowledge that 
has only watched the examination. In a shape of consciousness there is a 
specific form of objectivity and there are objects that appear in this form, as 
well as a corresponding way of knowing (putatively or actually). It is 
possible through the communication between philosophical knowledge 
and natural consciousness for a philosophical skepticism about conscious­
ness to consider the descriptively accessible phenomenal inventory of each 
shape with the purpose of understanding both what lesson can be drawn 
from its negation and what can be formulated as a positive content of the 
conscious experience that corresponds to the negation. This content serves 
to extract the motifs and constitutive features for a new standpoint of 
consciousness with a new form of objectivity and knowledge. The step 
from negative to positive experiential content, the " reversal of consciousness" 
(61, ^87) from the knowledge of a certain failure of knowing towards a 
new object, is indeed "contributed by us" (61 ^87). But if we take it 
accurately, it contains nothing more than the experience that was under­
gone by the previous form, so it must also be accepted by the natural 
consciousness that is pursuing its path. This is how "we," in the role of 
philosophical knowledge, conceive (more or less well) the emergence of a 
new shape of consciousness and the"origination (61, ^87) of its object and 
its concept of knowledge. The "grasp" of this progression from one form 
to the next may take place for an appearing philosophical knowledge, only 
with a certain (hopefully increasing) degree of stringency and clarity15 in 
See e.g. flin, 168. 
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each case. It can lead to scientific systematicity, for it already belongs to 
the a method of carrying out" the program. Perhaps one could even say the 
following. In the experience of the consciousness that is observed by 
philosophical knowing there thus looms "for us" (i.e. for the author and 
his readers in the role of knowing that is becoming scientific) a necessary 
progression from one particular form of consciousness to another. 
Further, in traversing the complete range of the forms of the unreal 
consciousness, there is the justified prospect of a methodically devel­
oped systematic whole of conscious experience. Insofar as the imple­
mentation must function in this way, and insofar as the systematicity of 
philosophical knowledge that is achieved through this methodical path 
just is its scientificity, the program can now be characterized, with richer 
content than before, as that of a "Science of the experience of conscious­
ness" (61, ^[88). It would, however, be illusory to believe that, on the basis 
of this information about its method and its scientificity, the program 
could be operationalized and implemented without further introduc­
tory reflections. 
Thirdly, the concluding remarks of the "Introduction" do not specify 
the course to be taken by the "Science of the experience of consciousness' (61, 
%SS) more precisely than anything Hegel has said up to that point. Thus 
they do not reveal much new information about the content of this 
experience and its arrangement. As Hegel notes in passing at the beginning, 
the path which the natural consciousness has to pursue can be taken as one 
of the soul, which journeys (qua such consciousness) "through the series of 
its own configurations . . . , so that it may purify itself for the life of Spirit" 
(55, I77). So one could expect that the figures of consciousness will pass 
over or merge into figures of Spirit. This is now affirmed. The experience 
that consciousness will undergo on the indicated path can, according to its 
concept, comprise nothing less than "the entire realm of the truth of Spirit" 
(61, ^89). At first it was not clear whether the talk about the purification of 
the soul already marked the end of the trajectory or was just an important 
stage. But now it becomes clear that only the latter could be meant. 
Consciousness will reach a point where "appearance becomes identical 
with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with 
the authentic Science of Spirit" (62, ^89). But only later on its path will 
consciousness grasp its essence and (presumably even later) will it "signify 
the nature of absolute knowledge itself (62, ^89). These suggestions are 
obviously insufficient to make further findings about the structure 
unnecessary. Thus, as proposed, the program of the Phenomenology has 
been further determined in the course of its implementation, without this 
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being attributable to rhetorical clumsiness, indecision, or even confused 
thinking. It can be taken as well-considered dramaturgy. 
4 
The implementation of the program confirms the vague anticipations that are 
made at the end of its Introduction and further specifies some of the 
Introduction's formulations.16 It makes sense for the implementation to 
begin before the program has been fully explicated, and before all stages of 
its realization have been neatly sketched, as long as the program is explicit 
enough to orient and initiate the upcoming steps of the implementation in 
each case, and later addenda to the explication of the program do not 
contradict the steps that have been taken up to that point. But the inter­
weaving of the implementation and presentation of the program does entail 
that during the course of the implementation many more structural dis­
tinctions must be considered than were indicated in the prior presentation of 
the program. The successive parts of the implementation distinguish them­
selves by formulating, tracing, and assessing the experience of consciousness. 
They also contain a preceding section that introduces the distinctive aspect of 
implementation by applying the general characterization of the program to a 
specific form of consciousness, and in turn assessing the concrete result of the 
directly preceding part of the implementation. But also, in the introductory 
discussion of these particular parts, more general reflections are made from 
case to case in order to gradually fill in the initially incomplete overview of 
the aim of the whole. Thus, the general "Introduction" continues in the 
special introductions to the particular parts of the implementation.17 In this 
continuation Hegel provides recapitulations that often lead much further 
back than just to the immediately preceding part, as well as anticipations 
(which are for the most part possible only from "our" perspective) that reach 
further forward than to the immediately following stage. Both directions 
take into account aspects that were not addressed by the general "introduc­
tory" information about the goal of the exposition and the method of its 
implementation. These aspects and the remarks made in their contexts belong 
just as much to our "contribution"18 as the comprehension of a particular form 
of consciousness on the basis of a conceptual elaboration of a previous 
16 Cf. 61­62, H 8 7 ­ 8 9 and 238­240, H 4 3 8 ­ 4 4 3 ; 62, ^89 and 367­368, ^ 6 8 1 ­ 6 6 8 etpassim. 
17 Reasonably, those in t roduct ions as well as these passages were wri t ten and pr in ted with specific t ides. 
1 For the different ia t ion of different kinds of "contr ibut ions" see Siep (2000) , 78. 
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conscious experience. But these additions do more than repeat the structural 
features of the method that were given in the Introduction and that lay out the 
basics of an exposition of appearing knowledge and of a Science of the 
experience of consciousness. More is now unveiled of the conceptual depth 
of these features and of the contents of appearing knowledge that has become 
manifest. It is much less easy to say how much of this depth is present to the 
natural consciousness in contrast to what has been added merely from "our" 
perspective. 
It is in fact possible to distinguish four kinds of progression in the text, (i) 
The most obvious, which is the passing over from the object of consciousness 
to its knowledge. (2) The repeated passing over to the object as well as a 
passing to and fro from that which is for the observing consciousness and that 
which is present only to us. (3) Something similar to this last movement, 
which one already finds in the introductory phase of the respective part of 
implementation. Even within this phase, which first and foremost prepares 
the exposition as well as the inspection (and the later elaboration) of the 
forthcoming actual"dialectical movement" (60, %S6), some claims are clearly 
only "for us," but others have disclosed themselves to the observed conscious­
ness on the basis of its phenomenal reservoir. (4) The third back and forth is 
intertwined with a fourth, which Hegel has left most unclear of all. There is a 
passing over from philosophical knowledge that at first appears (and hence 
contains something untrue) to the already scientific and real knowledge of the 
form of consciousness which is at issue, and from this a return to further (for 
the moment) merely appearing philosophical knowledge. Precisely because it 
is often difficult here to mark off what is (scientifically or prescientifically) 
merely "for us" and what is also "for it," the difference and the back and forth 
from one to the other has to be taken into account. 
There is yet a further aspect to Hegel's presentation. In contrast to the 
various "movements," the introductory passages of the sections offer "rest­
ing­points of reflection"19 that contribute to the "so­called intelligibility,"20 
so that the recapitulation and the anticipation can proceed based on "what 
has been vigorously deduced."21 Much is thereby illuminated which per­
tains to the development of the conceptual content of consciousness, not 
only for us, but also, though mostly with a different content, for the 
observed consciousness (and not infrequently for us and for consciousness 
19 Cf. Hegel 's letter to H . F . W . Hinr ichs , whose treatise on religion is deeply inspired by the 
Phenomenology. Hegel criticizes Hinr ichs for no t providing these rest ing­points and offers detailed 
c o m m e n t s on wha t they should consist in {Briefe), vol. 21, 254­255. Letters, 480—481. 
z° Briefe, vol. 2, 254. Letters, 480. 11 Briefe, vol. 2, 254­255. Letters, 480. 
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at once). Such resting-points are therefore not only required so that the 
reader can keep track and make sense of the exposition. Without them and 
the possibility they open up for inferring according to reasonable conse­
quence and for keeping the consequential relations stable, the "dialectical 
movement" would overly complicate the conceptual determinations. It 
would "water down" their contents so much that everything that is sup­
posed to be "expounded," i.e. clarified, would end up in a single mean­
ingless joke, or become pointless, especially for the natural consciousness 
pursuing its path. The possible transition to true knowledge ­ without 
which there can be no justification of the claims to knowledge in the 
Phenomenology — can only be granted to this natural consciousness through 
the fact that it develops potentials of inferring according to reasonable 
consequences, and finds in itself arrangements and definitional correlations 
that constitute the content of its own conceptual determinations.22 Of 
exemplary interest for this movement is the gradually developed structure 
of the work, which is indicated by bracketed capital letters in the table of 
contents of the Phenomenology. I would now like to go into the details and 
merits of this structure. 
This topic concerns the "architectonic" of the Phenomenology, so to 
speak. After the previous analysis, one should not expect that under this 
title one could offer a preconceived construction plan followed by the 
author that adequately informed readers could also follow. Even "we," the 
author and the readers Hegel intends to address, have to discover during 
the course of its development the structure of a science of the experience of 
consciousness, and we have to explore how natural consciousness becomes 
conscious of this science. 
This task is not so difficult with respect to the first three stages of the 
structure, with whose capital letters (A), (B), and (C) the first four stages of 
consciousness (I—IV) are contrasted with the next stage and all stages 
that may follow it afterwards (V,. . .). From a resting­point of reflection 
at the beginning of the fourth stage of consciousness, one can easily see in 
retrospect that in the previous three stages the object was for consciousness 
that which is in itself, while consciousness was that which is added, or 
accidental, whereas now by contrast self­consciousness has posited its 
object in immediate identity with itself. There is, as far as I can see, no 
22 The fundamentals regarding die dynamics of the Concept that are in effect behind the back of 
consciousness, and regarding the connection between "reasonable" [ Verstdndigem] and "speculative" 
[Spekulativem] in the determinations of the concept are explained, as will be obvious, only in the 
later Science of Logic, cf. Science of Logic, Second volume, first section, first chapter. 
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reason to believe that the difference from the previous standpoints of 
consciousness is concealed from the natural consciousness that has reached 
this standpoint as self-consciousness for itself, once its concept as that of 
appearing knowledge is "completed" (108, %iy6). The point "for us" is, of 
course, that this result of reflection is not located only in the concept that 
self-consciousness is for itself, but in the fact that self-consciousness has 
resulted from the dialectics of preceding experiences of consciousness. 
Something similar should apply to the phase of construction (C) that is 
reached by the subsequent stage of consciousness (V.). At this stage con­
sciousness knows its object as something that is in­and­for­itself and thus at 
the same time the certainty of itself. The basic determinations of conscious­
ness of the first two stages (A) and (B) are no longer opposed to one 
another, but united, and a third phase of construction is reached. Now, 
given the preceding path and the dialectics contained therein, we should 
not take it as settled that this stage needs to be identified once and for all 
with a consciousness that "has" reason ( = V). 
That this is not the case, but that the initially obvious identification 
must be revised, is shown by the further experience of this rational 
consciousness. It is at first a cognition based on observation, and it then 
progresses to the rational self­consciousness and its self­actualization. For 
us, this demand for revision should arise right after the first link in the 
chain of experiences and with the assessment of its result, i.e. at the 
beginning of section V.B. From this point onwards it becomes necessary 
to differentiate within the third phase of construction between the con­
ceptual content of the consciousness that belongs to it in general, i.e. (C), 
and a specification of it, namely (C) (AA) and the others. The "actualiza­
tion of reason" exists only for a consciousness or for a self­consciousness 
that has not yet reached the substance of its rationality or has lost it in the 
course of earlier history and is now striving to regain it (cf. 194, H 3 4 9 f f ) ; 
thus, it exists for a consciousness that is distinct from the consciousness of 
this substance and its objective reason, i.e. distinct from (C)(BB). On the 
other hand, at the beginning of stage V.B. all this may not be all that clear 
to the natural consciousness, but may be seen as the result only in retro­
spect. There are no decisive obstacles, however, to thinking that the 
following misidentifications are also corrected by the natural conscious­
ness, so that the fifth and sixth stages of consciousness can be identified 
with two successive steps of the third phase of construction. The same 
holds for .the identification of a further, third step (C) (CC) with a seventh 
stage of consciousness. Though things are complicated in each particular 
case, through further resting­points of reflection one can develop a concept 
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of the third phase of construction that is more determinate in content and 
internally more structured. This content, which is differentiated into 
moments of consciousness and self-consciousness, can be ascribed not 
only to "us," but also, from recognizable aspects of its path, to the natural 
consciousness. But an exposition of appearing knowledge cannot claim 
completeness for this subdivision of (C) into (C) (AA), (BB), and (CC). 
In preparation for such a claim, right at the beginning of stage VI. Hegel 
reports that for us all forms of consciousness and elements of the structure 
treated up to that point are collected in the form of the last of these moments 
(i.e. Spirit) and are abstractions from it (cf. 239-240, ^ 4 3 9 - 4 4 0 ) . At the 
next main resting-point (at the beginning of VII) we can see that what is now 
to be considered, namely religion, has also occurred in earlier forms of 
consciousness, even if it was not as conscious of itself as from the current 
standpoint (of religious self-consciousness). The more detailed configura­
tions of all previous moments of the structure now differentiate themselves 
into such that belong to the self­consciousness of Spirit in a particular form 
of religion. In light of the experience of religious self­consciousness in (C) 
(CC) and of the parallel history of the secular Spirit in (C) (BB), a relatively 
concise historical place can be assigned to all the configurations of conscious­
ness that are treated in those chapters, or were considered earlier. And this 
can be done in accord with reflection, hence as something that can be taken 
into the natural consciousness, although the reflection is possible only thanks 
to the previous dialectical movement and the speculative pursuit thereof. 
The implementation of this program thus explains at least the main parts of 
its division, and explains it also for the natural consciousness following its 
path in all stages of consciousness up to the very last. 
5 
But how much is prepared in the development of religious Spirit for the 
cognition of a necessary progression to such an absolute knowledge7. How 
much insight is gained that this knowledge will constitute an appropriate 
final part in the third phase of construction of a Science of the experience of 
consciousness? The table of contents affirms the assumption that the last 
part belongs as (C) (DD) to the third phase of construction. The last 
resting­point of reflection says more than what has been mentioned so far 
about the program of the Phenomenology and the task of its further 
determination. Although this is connected to problems that would need 
to be treated in detail, I can only outline them in what follows. I must 
postpone further treatment of these issues to another essay. 
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Before we approach the questions that are more difficult to answer, a few 
observations can be made from the perspective of the last two resting-
points of reflection (in VII and VIII). Apart from the form of philo­
sophical knowledge, the forms of consciousness and of Spirit that 
precede the last stage comprise the entire horizon of cognition. The 
last stage reconsiders the whole inventory of differentiated forms of 
unreal consciousness of what is true via the systematics created in 
those forms. By way of the self­examination of the natural conscious­
ness, it shows what part of the content of these forms has gained the 
potential to become actual cognition. The objection possible up to that 
point, that there is an impending progressus ad indefinitum into as yet 
unknown forms of consciousness, is thus swept away, and with it a main 
obstacle against the idea that the natural consciousness can complete its 
skepticism. In anticipation of the possible completion Hegel provides an 
inventory of forms at the beginning of the seventh stage of consciousness 
(cf. 364­368, ^ 6 7 5 ­ 6 7 9 ) . To reach this goal, not only the knowledge 
appearing in religion, but also the knowledge of morality will have to be 
surpassed. In view of this, the whole of Spirit, which has become present 
to itself in appearing knowledge (including that of religion) up to this 
point, will have to reorganize itself under a new concept. According to 
the last resting­point of reflection (at the beginning of VIII), this 
reorganization can take place only in a philosophical self­knowledge of 
Spirit in which all the appearing knowledge that has been presented is 
systematized. Given that the preconditions of such self­knowledge have 
been fulfilled, all external barriers against its possible passage to the true 
knowledge of what is true are eliminated for the natural consciousness 
(cf. 422­427, ^ 7 8 8 ­ 7 9 6 ) . If the Spirit had developed further in appear­
ing knowledge than was the case before the appearance of the 
Phenomenology in 1807, then this passage would "have yielded itself. . . 
in the form of a shape of consciousness" (427, ^[797).23 
The arrangement of VIII does not pose fundamental problems. In a 
charitable reading, this chapter can be divided (as with the previous 
ones) into (a) an introductory part which ends with the concept of the 
new form as well as with its knowledge and the content of this knowl­
edge (422­428, ^ 7 8 8 ­ 7 9 8 ) , (b) the part that portrays the appearance 
and (implicitly) the self­examination of the new consciousness (428­31, 
^ 7 9 9 ­ 8 0 3 ) , and (c) the concluding part which registers the result of the 
The use of this temporal conjunctivus irrealis in the contexts of Hegel's systematic­philosophical 
sentences is as sensational as it is singular. 
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self-examination for us (430-34, ^ 8 0 3 - 8 0 8 ) . If one registers attentively 
what constitutes the concept of the whole form and what is meant to 
constitute the experiential content of this movement of consciousness, 
then there can no longer be a question which side of the alternative 
interpretations presented above24 one should opt for. The decision can 
only be in favour of the second alternative in each case, as it can only be 
in favour of the interpretation that emphasizes Hegel's modernity.25 
2. Nevertheless, the problems Hegel's Phenomenology creates with the imple­
mentation of its program for contemplative readers do not begin just in 
(VIII). Instead of trying to examine them in a few words or claiming that they 
are irresolvable, I can here only set out the questions in an orderly fashion: 
(a) Even before the beginning of VIII one would like to know the 
following: D o Hegel's remarks in the seventh (and at the end of 
the sixth) chapter suffice as a preparation of the concept which 
consciousness becomes for itself in VIII? There is reason to doubt 
this, for already at the end of VI, but especially in VII, the elaboration 
of specific experiences of consciousness and self­consciousness is badly 
neglected. This makes it unclear why, for the natural consciousness 
of revealed religion, its appearing knowledge is not thoroughly real 
and true. It remains undecided whether this self­consciousness must 
proceed to a skeptically determinate knowledge of its ignorance 
(with regard to issues that cannot be left open for its aspiration to 
knowledge) or not. It is therefore also unclear how our treatment of 
the result of VII is to be connected with a renewed and deeper 
treatment of the result of VI. It is hard to make out how to integrate 
both results in the kind of coherent position Hegel describes at the 
beginning of VIII. It is even less clear what the chances are for a 
philosophizing consciousness in VIII to transfer this result to the 
new concept. Finally, there is the question of whether any factual 
reasons render the absence of conscious experience in the chapter on 
religion uncontroversial for what follows. These questions would 
probably become superfluous on the basis of a merely clarifying 
greater elaboration of the pertinent parts of the work. But in VIII the 
problematic traits are exacerbated. 
(b) Is the above­mentioned back and forth of reflection fully considered 
in VIII, including especially the fourth dimension? Is its claim and 
are the claims regarding the other dimensions at least implicitly 
Cf. section 3.2. This concerns especially the question mentioned at the end of section 2. 
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accounted for?2 This formal point is not the only one that gives rise 
to doubts. Is not the elaboration or re-elaboration of the results of 
the seventh and sixth chapters too narrow a basis for our reflection if 
we want to attain a concept to reorganize all previous forms of 
consciousness, a concept which is for itself the consciousness of a 
last form of Spirit? Would not all previous results of the experiences 
of consciousness (together with experience to be presented in VII) 
have to be explicitly re-elaborated? In this respect, is the opening 
thesis of VIII - that only the suspension of the mere form of 
representing consciousness is at issue - perhaps even a severe 
abridgement of the task confronting Hegel in this chapter? What 
ray of truth is nevertheless contained in the opening thesis? Where 
does its questionableness begin, or is it overcome? 
(c) The opening reflections, which are meant to serve not only to attain the 
new concept, but also to show that the thesis implied by the claim is at 
least basically and for us redeemable, raise a series of more specific 
questions in addition to the questions already mentioned. I shall 
confine myself here to the most salient of these questions: Would 
the programmed overcoming of the religious standpoint not have to 
be explicitly linked to the overcoming of mere morality in a modern 
ethical life? Would the appearing knowledge that is now made the 
subject of investigation (and that performs this double overcoming in 
its self-examination) not at the same time become cognizable as the 
knowledge of a specifically philosophical consciousness? This con­
sciousness would let absolute knowledge appear from the beginning, 
though it would not be actual in the way it at first appears, but in the 
course of numerous experiences would become an actually absolute 
knowledge. It would follow the passage of modern philosophy up to 
that point and end in a form that corresponds to the concept devel­
oped, namely the form of the Phenomenology available at that stage. It 
appears to me that this would be the orientation of an adequate final 
resting­point of reflection. 
(d) Since this orientation is missing, the experiential part of chapter VIII 
awakens the suspicion that it fails to fulfill the task set by the 
Hegel himself f o r m e d a very self­critical j u d g m e n t about this. See his letter to Schelling of M a y I, 
1807 and the letter to N i e t h a m m e r of January 16,1807, in which he aspires to a second edit ion of the 
Phenomenology (Briefe, vol. 1), 136, 161. Letters, 119­120, 79^80, As late as August 1829, when the 
second edit ion was eventually due, Hegel does not seem to have given up the plan to revise the work 
(see Briefe, vol. 4), 30. Letters, 121. It was only shortly before his death that he decided against such a 
revision, as an autographic note probably f r o m Fall 1831 indicates (see, for instance, PLG, 552). 
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program, and even that it makes the problems of this fulfillment 
unsolvable. Does Hegel here not confound the aspects decisive for 
this task with a point that is only peripherally relevant, namely with 
the question of philosophy's history, of when the philosophical 
science appears "in Time and in the actual world" (428, ^[800)? 
This is the question of the determinate being of absolute knowl­
edge in its appearing, of whether it appears only at that moment in 
which the conditions specifying the "when" are fulfilled. Given the 
dominance of this question, where does the topic of the self­
examination of appearing absolute knowledge and of the experi­
ences made therewith come in? How would its self­examination 
progress to the point at which the norm that belongs to its concept 
is established in experience? Is the exposition of the dialectical 
movement that leads to this experience of consciousness not sup­
pressed here by something negligible and insufficient? It is sup­
pressed first by an answer to the question of why Spirit appears 
earlier in time in the content of religion, but nevertheless only 
science can bring Spirit to true knowledge of itself. It is then further 
suppressed (cf. 430­431, ^803) by an extremely dense, concen­
trated, and external sketch of the history of modern intellectuality 
and philosophy up to Fichte and Schelling that ends with Hegel's 
critique of them. Does this sketch not provide far too vague a 
justification of the fact that Hegel opposes both Fichte's account 
of the philosophy of subjectivity and Schelling's philosophy of the 
Absolute? Does the cognitive perspective become increasingly 
focused on the most abstract questions of principles internal to 
philosophy, without considering the previously defined goal and 
everything that has substance and solid worth in the whole knowl­
edge that has appeared? Even if it were possible in this way to find a 
conclusion of the procedure that is for us adequate to the program, 
how could it be one that is also adequate for the natural conscious­
ness that is pursuing its path and is distinguished f rom us? H o w 
could we vindicate ourselves in the exposition of appearing knowl­
edge through that which has removed us from it? 
It is no longer surprising that considering all these open questions, 
the concluding part (431­434, ^ [[^ [803—808) takes on a problematic 
appearance. Does the exposition of the result, as postulated by the 
program, remain within the horizon of the science of the experience 
of consciousness, or does it leave this horizon in favor of a first 
statement about the "system of philosophy" and its structure? If the 
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latter is the case, can the Phenomenology in the end be convincingly 
designated as the "Science of appearing knowledge" (434, ^[808), 
and can the final intertitle "Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit" 
be introduced? Does not the claim marked by this title (through the 
addition of "I"), that it figures as the first science, work against the 
implementation of its program, since it could be justified only on 
the basis of a "system of science," and as the first part of this system, 
while the knowledge of this system and everything pertaining to it 
needs to be substantiated by the introductory science? 
3. I am in no way willing to assume that the Phenomenology in its published 
version allows us to arrive at satisfactory answers to all these questions. 
In those parts to which the questions are addressed, an improved edition 
would be required. But judging from the essentials of the program and 
the concept of its implementation, this reworking could, it seems to me, 
be successful, and the title of a "Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit" 
could be justified. As a work that, according to its own aspiration, has to 
account for the Spiritual situation at the time of its appearance, the 
improved version would, if it were to be written nowadays, have to take 
into account the historical changes that have occurred since 1807 in the 
consciousness that has reason, in the history of ethical life that is reason, 
in the field of religious self-consciousness, and through the experience 
with posthegelian and postmodern philosophy. Such a continuation of 
the Phenomenology would be the worthiest gift for the 200th anniversary 
of this work. This is what I hereby request of the thinking experts of a 
younger generation. 
